Flo 09f6369bec refactor: group apply prompts with explanations
Replace ~25 individual y/n prompts with 6 logical groups, each showing
a table of pending changes with one-line explanations before prompting.
Also fix FIDO2 middleware detection (needs brew openssh, not just libfido2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-31 15:30:00 +02:00
2026-03-30 13:39:40 +02:00
2026-03-30 13:39:40 +02:00
2026-03-31 14:03:29 +02:00
2026-03-30 13:39:40 +02:00
2026-03-31 14:03:29 +02:00
2026-03-30 13:39:40 +02:00
2026-03-31 14:03:29 +02:00

git-harden.sh

Audit and harden your global git configuration with security-focused defaults.

Protects against history rewriting, supply chain attacks, credential theft, and malicious repository exploitation. Runs on macOS and Linux.

Quick Start

# Clone and run
git clone https://github.com/YOUR_ORG/git-hardening.git
cd git-hardening
chmod +x git-harden.sh

# Audit your current config (no changes)
./git-harden.sh --audit

# Interactive mode — review and approve each change
./git-harden.sh

# Apply all recommended defaults without prompting
./git-harden.sh -y

On first interactive run, the script asks you to confirm you've reviewed it for safety. If you haven't, it prints instructions for piping it to Claude Code or Gemini CLI for an automated review.

What It Does

The script runs in two phases:

  1. Audit — scans your current git config --global and ~/.ssh/config, prints a color-coded report:
    • [OK] already set to the recommended value
    • [WARN] set to a non-recommended value
    • [MISS] not configured
  2. Apply — for each non-OK setting, shows what it does and prompts you to accept or skip (or auto-applies with -y)

Settings Applied

Category What it does
Identity user.useConfigOnly=true — prevents commits without explicit identity
Object integrity fsckObjects on transfer/fetch/receive, transfer.bundleURI=false, fetch.prune=true
Protocol restrictions Default-deny policy: only HTTPS and SSH. Blocks git:// and ext://. Forces protocol.version=2
Filesystem protection core.protectNTFS, core.protectHFS, core.fsmonitor=false, core.symlinks=false (interactive-only)
Hook control Redirects core.hooksPath to ~/.config/git/hooks so repo-local hooks can't execute
Pre-commit hook Installs gitleaks secret scanner as global pre-commit hook (with SKIP_GITLEAKS bypass)
Repository safety safe.bareRepository=explicit, submodule.recurse=false, detects/removes safe.directory=* wildcard
Pull/merge hardening pull.ff=only, merge.ff=only — refuses non-fast-forward merges
Transport security Rewrites http:// to https://, enforces http.sslVerify=true
Credential storage Platform-detected secure helper (osxkeychain on macOS, libsecret on Linux). Warns if using plaintext store
Credential hygiene Warns about plaintext ~/.git-credentials, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc (tokens), ~/.pypirc (passwords)
Global gitignore Creates ~/.config/git/ignore with patterns for secrets, credentials, and OS/IDE artifacts
Defaults init.defaultBranch=main
Forensic readiness Extended reflog retention (gc.reflogExpire=180.days, gc.reflogExpireUnreachable=90.days)
Commit signing SSH-based signing with interactive key setup wizard (software or FIDO2 hardware key)
SSH hardening StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, HashKnownHosts=yes, IdentitiesOnly=yes, modern algorithm restrictions
SSH key hygiene Audits ~/.ssh/*.pub for weak key types (DSA, ECDSA, short RSA)
Visibility log.showSignature=true

A config backup is saved to ~/.config/git/pre-harden-backup-<timestamp>.txt before any changes.

Signing Setup

The script includes an interactive wizard that:

  1. Detects existing SSH keys (including custom-named keys from ~/.ssh/config)
  2. Detects FIDO2 hardware (YubiKey, etc.)
  3. Offers two tiers:
    • Software SSH key — use existing ed25519 or generate one
    • FIDO2 hardware key — generate ed25519-sk with touch-to-sign (if hardware detected)
  4. Configures user.signingkey, commit.gpgsign, tag.gpgsign
  5. Sets up ~/.config/git/allowed_signers for local signature verification

With -y, the script auto-detects the best available key. If no key exists, signing config is prepared but not enabled (to avoid breaking commits).

Privacy note: The signing wizard warns that reusing the same signing key across personal and work accounts enables cross-platform identity correlation (OSINT risk). For identity separation, generate dedicated keys per context and use git's includeIf for per-org config.

Usage

git-harden.sh [OPTIONS]

Options:
  --audit       Audit only, no changes (exit code 2 if issues found)
  -y, --yes     Auto-apply all recommended defaults
  --help, -h    Show help
  --version     Show version

Exit Codes

Code Meaning
0 All OK, or changes applied successfully
1 Error (missing dependencies, etc.)
2 Audit found issues (--audit mode)

Requirements

  • git >= 2.34.0 (required for SSH signing)
  • ssh-keygen
  • Bash 3.2+ (compatible with macOS default bash)

Optional:

  • gitleaks for pre-commit secret scanning (hook is installed regardless; scans run only if gitleaks is on $PATH)
  • ykman or fido2-token for FIDO2 hardware key detection

Threat Model

What this protects against

  • History rewritingpull.ff=only and merge.ff=only refuse non-fast-forward operations, making force-pushed changes visible
  • Object injectionfsckObjects validates every object transferred, catching corruption or malicious payloads
  • Protocol downgrade — blocks plaintext git:// and dangerous ext:// protocol
  • Hook-based RCE — redirects hook execution away from repo-local .git/hooks/
  • Submodule attacks — disables auto-recursion; submodules must be explicitly initialized
  • Credential theft — ensures secure credential storage, warns about plaintext store, detects leaked credentials in ~/.git-credentials, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc
  • Secret leakage — gitleaks pre-commit hook blocks commits containing secrets before they enter git history
  • Commit impersonation — SSH signing proves key possession (anyone can fake user.name/user.email)
  • Filesystem tricks — blocks NTFS/HFS+/symlink path manipulation attacks
  • Weak SSH keys — audits and warns about DSA, ECDSA, and short RSA keys

What this does NOT protect against

  • A compromised machine (malware can use cached keys)
  • Malicious code from an authorized signer
  • Historical unsigned commits (signing is not retroactive)
  • Server-side misconfigurations (see admin recommendations printed by the script)

Admin Recommendations

The script prints (but does not apply) server/org-level recommendations:

  • Enable "require signed commits" on protected branches
  • Enable GitHub/GitLab vigilant mode
  • Restrict force-pushes server-side
  • Use fine-grained, short-lived tokens in CI/CD
  • Maintain an allowed signers file in repos
  • Clone untrusted repos with --no-recurse-submodules
  • Use separate signing keys per org to prevent cross-platform identity correlation (OSINT)

Running Tests

# Run the BATS test suite (90 tests)
./test/run.sh

# Requires bats-core submodules — init them if needed
git submodule update --init --recursive

Tests run in an isolated $HOME (via mktemp) and never touch your real git or SSH config.

License

MIT

Description
bash script to interactively setup a hardened git config
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