#!/usr/bin/env bash
# git-harden.sh — Audit and harden global git configuration
# Usage: git-harden.sh [--audit] [-y] [--help]
set -o errexit
set -o nounset
set -o pipefail
IFS=$'\n\t'
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Constants
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
readonly VERSION="0.2.3"
readonly BACKUP_DIR="${HOME}/.config/git"
readonly HOOKS_DIR="${HOME}/.config/git/hooks"
readonly ALLOWED_SIGNERS_FILE="${HOME}/.config/git/allowed_signers"
readonly GLOBAL_GITIGNORE="${HOME}/.config/git/ignore"
readonly SSH_DIR="${HOME}/.ssh"
readonly SSH_CONFIG="${SSH_DIR}/config"
# Color codes (empty if not a terminal)
if [ -t 2 ]; then
readonly RED='\033[0;31m'
readonly GREEN='\033[0;32m'
readonly YELLOW='\033[0;33m'
readonly BLUE='\033[0;34m'
readonly BOLD='\033[1m'
readonly RESET='\033[0m'
else
readonly RED=''
readonly GREEN=''
readonly YELLOW=''
readonly BLUE=''
readonly BOLD=''
readonly RESET=''
fi
# Mode flags (mutable — set by parse_args)
AUTO_YES=false
AUDIT_ONLY=false
PLATFORM=""
# Audit counters
AUDIT_OK=0
AUDIT_WARN=0
AUDIT_MISS=0
# Whether signing key was found
SIGNING_KEY_FOUND=false
SIGNING_PUB_PATH=""
# Credential helper detected for this platform
DETECTED_CRED_HELPER=""
# Optional tool availability
HAS_YKMAN=false
HAS_FIDO2_TOKEN=false
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
die() {
printf '%bError:%b %s\n' "$RED" "$RESET" "$1" >&2
exit 1
}
# Strip inline comments and surrounding quotes from an SSH config value.
# Handles: value # comment, "value", 'value', "value" # comment
strip_ssh_value() {
local val="$1"
# Remove inline comment (not inside quotes): strip ' #...' from end
# Be careful: only strip ' #' preceded by space (not part of path)
val="$(printf '%s' "$val" | sed 's/[[:space:]]#.*$//')"
# Remove surrounding double quotes
val="${val#\"}"
val="${val%\"}"
# Remove surrounding single quotes
val="${val#\'}"
val="${val%\'}"
# Trim whitespace
val="$(printf '%s' "$val" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//;s/[[:space:]]*$//')"
printf '%s' "$val"
}
print_ok() {
printf '%b[OK]%b %s\n' "$GREEN" "$RESET" "$1" >&2
AUDIT_OK=$((AUDIT_OK + 1))
}
print_warn() {
printf '%b[WARN]%b %s\n' "$YELLOW" "$RESET" "$1" >&2
AUDIT_WARN=$((AUDIT_WARN + 1))
}
print_miss() {
printf '%b[MISS]%b %s\n' "$RED" "$RESET" "$1" >&2
AUDIT_MISS=$((AUDIT_MISS + 1))
}
print_info() {
printf '%b[INFO]%b %s\n' "$BLUE" "$RESET" "$1" >&2
}
print_header() {
printf '\n%b── %s ──%b\n' "$BOLD" "$1" "$RESET" >&2
}
prompt_yn() {
local prompt="$1"
local default="${2:-y}"
if [ "$AUTO_YES" = true ]; then
return 0
fi
local yn_hint
if [ "$default" = "y" ]; then
yn_hint="[Y/n]"
else
yn_hint="[y/N]"
fi
local answer
printf '%s %s ' "$prompt" "$yn_hint" >&2
read -r answer &2 <<'EOF'
Usage: git-harden.sh [OPTIONS]
Audit and harden your global git configuration.
Options:
--audit Run audit only (no changes), exit 0 if all OK, 2 if issues found
-y, --yes Auto-apply all recommended settings (no prompts)
--help, -h Show this help message
--version Show version
Exit codes:
0 All settings OK, or changes successfully applied
1 Error (missing dependencies, etc.)
2 Audit found issues (--audit mode only)
EOF
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Platform detection
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
detect_platform() {
local uname_out
uname_out="$(uname -s)"
case "$uname_out" in
Darwin*) PLATFORM="macos" ;;
Linux*) PLATFORM="linux" ;;
*) die "Unsupported platform: $uname_out" ;;
esac
}
# Compare version strings: returns 0 if $1 >= $2
version_gte() {
local IFS_SAVE="$IFS"
IFS='.'
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
set -- $1 $2
IFS="$IFS_SAVE"
# Force base-10 interpretation to avoid octal issues with leading zeros
local a1=$((10#${1:-0})) a2=$((10#${2:-0})) a3=$((10#${3:-0}))
local b1=$((10#${4:-0})) b2=$((10#${5:-0})) b3=$((10#${6:-0}))
if [ "$a1" -gt "$b1" ]; then return 0; fi
if [ "$a1" -lt "$b1" ]; then return 1; fi
if [ "$a2" -gt "$b2" ]; then return 0; fi
if [ "$a2" -lt "$b2" ]; then return 1; fi
if [ "$a3" -ge "$b3" ]; then return 0; fi
return 1
}
check_dependencies() {
# git required
if ! command -v git >/dev/null 2>&1; then
die "git is not installed"
fi
local git_version
git_version="$(git --version | grep -oE '[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' | head -1)"
if [ -z "$git_version" ]; then
die "Could not parse git version from: $(git --version)"
fi
if ! version_gte "$git_version" "2.34.0"; then
die "git >= 2.34.0 required (found $git_version)"
fi
# ssh-keygen required
if ! command -v ssh-keygen >/dev/null 2>&1; then
die "ssh-keygen is not installed"
fi
# Optional: ykman
if command -v ykman >/dev/null 2>&1; then
HAS_YKMAN=true
fi
# Optional: fido2-token
if command -v fido2-token >/dev/null 2>&1; then
HAS_FIDO2_TOKEN=true
fi
# Detect credential helper
detect_credential_helper
}
detect_credential_helper() {
case "$PLATFORM" in
macos)
DETECTED_CRED_HELPER="osxkeychain"
;;
linux)
# Try to find libsecret credential helper
local libsecret_path=""
for path in \
/usr/lib/git-core/git-credential-libsecret \
/usr/libexec/git-core/git-credential-libsecret \
/usr/lib/git/git-credential-libsecret; do
if [ -x "$path" ]; then
libsecret_path="$path"
break
fi
done
if [ -n "$libsecret_path" ]; then
DETECTED_CRED_HELPER="$libsecret_path"
else
DETECTED_CRED_HELPER="cache --timeout=3600"
print_info "libsecret not found; falling back to in-memory credential cache (1h TTL, not persistent)"
fi
;;
esac
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Audit functions
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Check a single git config key against expected value.
# Returns: prints status, updates counters.
audit_git_setting() {
local key="$1"
local expected="$2"
local label="${3:-$key}"
local current
current="$(git config --global --get "$key" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$current" ]; then
print_miss "$label (expected: $expected)"
elif [ "$current" = "$expected" ]; then
print_ok "$label = $current"
else
print_warn "$label = $current (expected: $expected)"
fi
}
audit_git_config() {
print_header "Identity"
audit_git_setting "user.useConfigOnly" "true"
print_header "Object Integrity"
audit_git_setting "transfer.fsckObjects" "true"
audit_git_setting "fetch.fsckObjects" "true"
audit_git_setting "receive.fsckObjects" "true"
audit_git_setting "transfer.bundleURI" "false"
audit_git_setting "fetch.prune" "true"
print_header "Protocol Restrictions"
audit_git_setting "protocol.version" "2"
audit_git_setting "protocol.allow" "never"
audit_git_setting "protocol.https.allow" "always"
audit_git_setting "protocol.ssh.allow" "always"
audit_git_setting "protocol.file.allow" "user"
audit_git_setting "protocol.git.allow" "never"
audit_git_setting "protocol.ext.allow" "never"
print_header "Filesystem Protection"
audit_git_setting "core.protectNTFS" "true"
audit_git_setting "core.protectHFS" "true"
audit_git_setting "core.fsmonitor" "false"
audit_git_setting "core.symlinks" "false"
print_header "Hook Control"
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: git config stores literal ~
audit_git_setting "core.hooksPath" "~/.config/git/hooks"
print_header "Repository Safety"
audit_git_setting "safe.bareRepository" "explicit"
audit_git_setting "submodule.recurse" "false"
# Detect dangerous safe.directory = * wildcard (CVE-2022-24765)
local safe_dirs
safe_dirs="$(git config --global --get-all safe.directory 2>/dev/null || true)"
if printf '%s\n' "$safe_dirs" | grep -qx '\*'; then
print_warn "safe.directory = * disables ownership checks (CVE-2022-24765). Remove this setting."
fi
print_header "Pull/Merge Hardening"
audit_git_setting "pull.ff" "only"
audit_git_setting "merge.ff" "only"
# AC-15: warn if pull.rebase is set (conflicts with pull.ff=only)
local pull_rebase
pull_rebase="$(git config --global --get pull.rebase 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$pull_rebase" ]; then
print_warn "pull.rebase = $pull_rebase (conflicts with pull.ff=only — consider unsetting)"
fi
print_header "Transport Security"
# url..insteadOf needs special handling
local instead_of
instead_of="$(git config --global --get 'url.https://.insteadOf' 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$instead_of" ]; then
print_miss "url.\"https://\".insteadOf (expected: http://)"
elif [ "$instead_of" = "http://" ]; then
print_ok "url.\"https://\".insteadOf = http://"
else
print_warn "url.\"https://\".insteadOf = $instead_of (expected: http://)"
fi
audit_git_setting "http.sslVerify" "true"
print_header "Credential Storage"
local cred_current
cred_current="$(git config --global --get credential.helper 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$cred_current" ]; then
print_miss "credential.helper (expected: $DETECTED_CRED_HELPER)"
elif [ "$cred_current" = "store" ]; then
print_warn "credential.helper = store (INSECURE: stores passwords in plaintext; expected: $DETECTED_CRED_HELPER)"
elif [ "$cred_current" = "$DETECTED_CRED_HELPER" ]; then
print_ok "credential.helper = $cred_current"
else
# Non-store, non-recommended — could be user's custom helper
print_warn "credential.helper = $cred_current (expected: $DETECTED_CRED_HELPER)"
fi
print_header "Defaults"
audit_git_setting "init.defaultBranch" "main"
print_header "Forensic Readiness"
audit_git_setting "gc.reflogExpire" "180.days"
audit_git_setting "gc.reflogExpireUnreachable" "90.days"
print_header "Visibility"
audit_git_setting "log.showSignature" "true"
}
audit_precommit_hook() {
print_header "Pre-commit Hook"
local hook_path="${HOOKS_DIR}/pre-commit"
if [ ! -f "$hook_path" ]; then
print_miss "No pre-commit hook at $hook_path"
return
fi
if [ ! -x "$hook_path" ]; then
print_warn "Pre-commit hook exists but is not executable: $hook_path"
return
fi
if grep -q 'gitleaks' "$hook_path" 2>/dev/null; then
print_ok "Pre-commit hook with gitleaks at $hook_path"
else
print_warn "Pre-commit hook exists but does not reference gitleaks (user-managed)"
fi
}
audit_global_gitignore() {
print_header "Global Gitignore"
local excludes_file
excludes_file="$(git config --global --get core.excludesFile 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$excludes_file" ]; then
print_miss "core.excludesFile (no global gitignore configured)"
return
fi
# Expand tilde
local expanded_path
expanded_path="${excludes_file/#\~/$HOME}"
if [ ! -f "$expanded_path" ]; then
print_warn "core.excludesFile = $excludes_file (file does not exist)"
return
fi
# Check for key security patterns
local has_security_patterns=false
if grep -q '\.env' "$expanded_path" 2>/dev/null && \
grep -q '\*\.pem' "$expanded_path" 2>/dev/null; then
has_security_patterns=true
fi
if [ "$has_security_patterns" = true ]; then
print_ok "core.excludesFile = $excludes_file (contains security patterns)"
else
print_warn "core.excludesFile = $excludes_file (lacks secret patterns: .env, *.pem, *.key — consider adding them)"
fi
}
audit_credential_hygiene() {
print_header "Credential Hygiene"
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: ~ used as display text
# ~/.git-credentials — plaintext git passwords
if [ -f "${HOME}/.git-credentials" ]; then
print_warn "~/.git-credentials exists (plaintext git credentials — migrate to credential helper and delete this file)"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: ~ used as display text
# ~/.netrc — plaintext network credentials
if [ -f "${HOME}/.netrc" ]; then
print_warn "~/.netrc exists (plaintext network credentials — may contain git hosting tokens)"
fi
# ~/.npmrc — check for actual auth tokens
if [ -f "${HOME}/.npmrc" ]; then
if grep -qE '_authToken=.+' "${HOME}/.npmrc" 2>/dev/null; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: ~ used as display text
print_warn "~/.npmrc contains auth token (plaintext npm registry token — use env vars instead)"
fi
fi
# ~/.pypirc — check for password field
if [ -f "${HOME}/.pypirc" ]; then
if grep -qE '^[[:space:]]*password' "${HOME}/.pypirc" 2>/dev/null; then
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: ~ used as display text
print_warn "~/.pypirc contains password (plaintext PyPI credentials — use keyring or token-based auth)"
fi
fi
}
audit_ssh_key_hygiene() {
print_header "SSH Key Hygiene"
local pub_files=()
local seen_files=""
# Collect ~/.ssh/*.pub files
local f
for f in "${SSH_DIR}"/*.pub; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
pub_files+=("$f")
seen_files="${seen_files}|${f}"
done
# Also collect keys from IdentityFile directives in ~/.ssh/config
if [ -f "$SSH_CONFIG" ]; then
local identity_path
while IFS= read -r identity_path; do
identity_path="$(strip_ssh_value "$identity_path")"
[ -z "$identity_path" ] && continue
identity_path="${identity_path/#\~/$HOME}"
local pub_path="${identity_path}.pub"
if [ -f "$pub_path" ]; then
# Skip if already seen
case "$seen_files" in
*"|${pub_path}"*) continue ;;
esac
pub_files+=("$pub_path")
seen_files="${seen_files}|${pub_path}"
fi
done </dev/null | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*[Ii][Dd][Ee][Nn][Tt][Ii][Tt][Yy][Ff][Ii][Ll][Ee][[:space:]=]*//')
EOF
fi
if [ ${#pub_files[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
print_info "No SSH public keys found"
return
fi
local key_type bits label
for f in "${pub_files[@]}"; do
key_type="$(awk '{print $1}' "$f" 2>/dev/null || true)"
label="$(basename "$f")"
case "$key_type" in
ssh-ed25519)
print_ok "SSH key $label (ed25519)"
;;
sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com|sk-ssh-ed25519*)
print_ok "SSH key $label (ed25519-sk, hardware-backed)"
;;
sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com|sk-ecdsa-sha2*)
print_ok "SSH key $label (ecdsa-sk, hardware-backed)"
;;
ssh-rsa)
bits="$(ssh-keygen -l -f "$f" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' || true)"
if [ -n "$bits" ] && [ "$bits" -lt 2048 ] 2>/dev/null; then
print_warn "SSH key $label (RSA ${bits}-bit — weak, migrate to ed25519 immediately)"
else
print_warn "SSH key $label (RSA ${bits:-?}-bit — consider migrating to ed25519)"
fi
;;
ssh-dss)
print_warn "SSH key $label (DSA — deprecated, migrate to ed25519)"
;;
ecdsa-sha2-*)
print_warn "SSH key $label (ECDSA — consider migrating to ed25519)"
;;
*)
print_info "SSH key $label (unknown type: $key_type)"
;;
esac
done
}
audit_signing() {
print_header "Signing Configuration"
audit_git_setting "gpg.format" "ssh"
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: git config stores literal ~
audit_git_setting "gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile" "~/.config/git/allowed_signers"
# Check signing key
local signing_key
signing_key="$(git config --global --get user.signingkey 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$signing_key" ]; then
print_miss "user.signingkey (no signing key configured)"
else
# Verify the key file exists
local expanded_key
expanded_key="${signing_key/#\~/$HOME}"
if [ -f "$expanded_key" ]; then
print_ok "user.signingkey = $signing_key"
else
# Key might be an inline key (starts with ssh-)
case "$signing_key" in
ssh-*|ecdsa-*|sk-*)
print_ok "user.signingkey = (inline key)"
;;
*)
print_warn "user.signingkey = $signing_key (file not found)"
;;
esac
fi
fi
audit_git_setting "commit.gpgsign" "true"
audit_git_setting "tag.gpgsign" "true"
audit_git_setting "tag.forceSignAnnotated" "true"
}
audit_ssh_directive() {
local directive="$1"
local expected="$2"
local current
current="$(grep -i "^[[:space:]]*${directive}[[:space:]=]" "$SSH_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]=]*[[:space:]=]*//' || true)"
current="$(strip_ssh_value "$current")"
if [ -z "$current" ]; then
print_miss "SSH: $directive (expected: $expected)"
elif [ "$current" = "$expected" ]; then
print_ok "SSH: $directive = $current"
else
print_warn "SSH: $directive = $current (expected: $expected)"
fi
}
audit_ssh_config() {
print_header "SSH Configuration"
if [ ! -f "$SSH_CONFIG" ]; then
print_miss "$SSH_CONFIG does not exist"
return
fi
audit_ssh_directive "StrictHostKeyChecking" "accept-new"
audit_ssh_directive "HashKnownHosts" "yes"
audit_ssh_directive "IdentitiesOnly" "yes"
audit_ssh_directive "AddKeysToAgent" "yes"
audit_ssh_directive "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" "ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
}
print_audit_report() {
print_header "Audit Summary"
printf '%b %d OK / %d WARN / %d MISS%b\n' \
"$BOLD" "$AUDIT_OK" "$AUDIT_WARN" "$AUDIT_MISS" "$RESET" >&2
if [ $((AUDIT_WARN + AUDIT_MISS)) -gt 0 ]; then
return 2
fi
return 0
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Apply functions
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
backup_git_config() {
local config_file="${HOME}/.gitconfig"
local xdg_config="${HOME}/.config/git/config"
mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR"
local timestamp
timestamp="$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)"
local backup_file="${BACKUP_DIR}/pre-harden-backup-${timestamp}.txt"
{
echo "# git-harden.sh backup — $timestamp"
echo "# Global git config snapshot"
echo ""
if [ -f "$config_file" ]; then
echo "## ~/.gitconfig"
cat "$config_file"
echo ""
fi
if [ -f "$xdg_config" ]; then
echo "## ~/.config/git/config"
cat "$xdg_config"
echo ""
fi
echo "## git config --global --list"
git config --global --list 2>/dev/null || echo "(no global config)"
} > "$backup_file"
print_info "Config backed up to $backup_file"
}
# Check if a git config setting needs changing. Returns 0 if it does.
setting_needs_change() {
local key="$1"
local value="$2"
local current
current="$(git config --global --get "$key" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ "$current" != "$value" ]
}
# Apply a group of git config settings with a single prompt.
# Arguments: group_name description key1 value1 explanation1 key2 value2 explanation2 ...
apply_setting_group() {
local group_name="$1"
local description="$2"
shift 2
# Collect pending changes (settings that need updating)
local pending_keys=""
local pending_vals=""
local pending_explanations=""
local count=0
while [ $# -ge 3 ]; do
local key="$1" value="$2" explanation="$3"
shift 3
if setting_needs_change "$key" "$value"; then
pending_keys="${pending_keys}${key}"$'\n'
pending_vals="${pending_vals}${value}"$'\n'
pending_explanations="${pending_explanations}${explanation}"$'\n'
count=$((count + 1))
fi
done
# Nothing to do
if [ "$count" -eq 0 ]; then
return 0
fi
print_header "$group_name"
printf ' %s\n\n' "$description" >&2
# Show what will change
local i=0
while [ "$i" -lt "$count" ]; do
local key val expl
key="$(printf '%s' "$pending_keys" | sed -n "$((i + 1))p")"
val="$(printf '%s' "$pending_vals" | sed -n "$((i + 1))p")"
expl="$(printf '%s' "$pending_explanations" | sed -n "$((i + 1))p")"
printf ' %-40s %s\n' "${key} = ${val}" "# ${expl}" >&2
i=$((i + 1))
done
printf '\n' >&2
if prompt_yn "Apply these ${count} settings?"; then
i=0
while [ "$i" -lt "$count" ]; do
local key val
key="$(printf '%s' "$pending_keys" | sed -n "$((i + 1))p")"
val="$(printf '%s' "$pending_vals" | sed -n "$((i + 1))p")"
git config --global "$key" "$val"
i=$((i + 1))
done
print_info "Applied ${count} settings"
fi
}
apply_git_config() {
# --- Group 1: Object Integrity ---
apply_setting_group "Object Integrity" \
"Validate all transferred git objects to catch corruption or malicious payloads." \
"transfer.fsckObjects" "true" "Verify objects on transfer" \
"fetch.fsckObjects" "true" "Verify objects on fetch" \
"receive.fsckObjects" "true" "Verify objects on receive" \
"transfer.bundleURI" "false" "Disable bundle URI fetching (attack surface)" \
"fetch.prune" "true" "Auto-remove stale remote tracking refs"
# --- Group 2: Protocol Restrictions ---
apply_setting_group "Protocol Restrictions" \
"Default-deny policy: only HTTPS and SSH allowed." \
"protocol.version" "2" "Use wire protocol v2 (faster, smaller surface)" \
"protocol.allow" "never" "Default-deny all protocols" \
"protocol.https.allow" "always" "Allow HTTPS" \
"protocol.ssh.allow" "always" "Allow SSH" \
"protocol.file.allow" "user" "Allow local file protocol (user-initiated only)" \
"protocol.git.allow" "never" "Block unencrypted git:// protocol" \
"protocol.ext.allow" "never" "Block ext:// (arbitrary command execution)"
# --- Group 3: Filesystem & Repository Safety ---
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: git config stores literal ~
local hooks_path_val="~/.config/git/hooks"
apply_setting_group "Filesystem & Repository Safety" \
"Prevent path traversal, malicious hooks, and unsafe repo configurations." \
"core.protectNTFS" "true" "Block NTFS 8.3 short-name attacks" \
"core.protectHFS" "true" "Block HFS+ Unicode normalization attacks" \
"core.fsmonitor" "false" "Disable filesystem monitor (attack surface)" \
"core.hooksPath" "$hooks_path_val" "Redirect hooks to central dir" \
"safe.bareRepository" "explicit" "Require --git-dir for bare repos" \
"submodule.recurse" "false" "Don't auto-recurse into submodules"
# core.symlinks: interactive-only (may break symlink-dependent workflows)
if [ "$AUTO_YES" = false ]; then
local current_symlinks
current_symlinks="$(git config --global --get core.symlinks 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ "$current_symlinks" != "false" ]; then
if prompt_yn "Disable symlinks (CVE-2024-32002)? May break Node.js monorepos, etc."; then
git config --global core.symlinks false
print_info "Set core.symlinks = false"
fi
fi
fi
# Remove dangerous safe.directory = * wildcard if present
local safe_dirs
safe_dirs="$(git config --global --get-all safe.directory 2>/dev/null || true)"
if printf '%s\n' "$safe_dirs" | grep -qx '\*'; then
if prompt_yn "Remove dangerous safe.directory = * (disables ownership checks, CVE-2022-24765)?"; then
git config --global --unset 'safe.directory' '\*' 2>/dev/null || \
git config --global --unset-all 'safe.directory' '\*' 2>/dev/null || true
print_info "Removed safe.directory = *"
fi
fi
mkdir -p "$HOOKS_DIR"
# --- Group 4: Pull/Merge & Transport ---
# url.https.insteadOf needs special handling — check first
local instead_of
instead_of="$(git config --global --get 'url.https://.insteadOf' 2>/dev/null || true)"
apply_setting_group "Pull/Merge & Transport Security" \
"Refuse non-fast-forward merges and force HTTPS." \
"pull.ff" "only" "Reject non-fast-forward pulls" \
"merge.ff" "only" "Reject non-fast-forward merges" \
"http.sslVerify" "true" "Enforce TLS certificate validation"
# url rewrite is separate (not a simple key=value)
if [ "$instead_of" != "http://" ]; then
if prompt_yn "Rewrite http:// URLs to https:// automatically?"; then
git config --global 'url.https://.insteadOf' 'http://'
print_info "Set url.\"https://\".insteadOf = http://"
fi
fi
# --- Group 5: Credential, Identity & Defaults ---
local cred_current
cred_current="$(git config --global --get credential.helper 2>/dev/null || true)"
apply_setting_group "Identity, Credentials & Defaults" \
"Prevent accidental identity, enforce secure credential storage." \
"user.useConfigOnly" "true" "Block commits without explicit user.name/email" \
"init.defaultBranch" "main" "Default branch name for new repos" \
"log.showSignature" "true" "Show signature status in git log"
# Credential helper needs special logic (warn about 'store')
if [ "$cred_current" != "$DETECTED_CRED_HELPER" ]; then
local cred_prompt="Set credential.helper = $DETECTED_CRED_HELPER?"
if [ "$cred_current" = "store" ]; then
cred_prompt="Replace INSECURE credential.helper=store with $DETECTED_CRED_HELPER?"
fi
if prompt_yn "$cred_prompt"; then
git config --global credential.helper "$DETECTED_CRED_HELPER"
print_info "Set credential.helper = $DETECTED_CRED_HELPER"
fi
fi
# --- Group 6: Forensic Readiness ---
apply_setting_group "Forensic Readiness" \
"Extend reflog retention for post-incident investigation." \
"gc.reflogExpire" "180.days" "Keep reachable reflog 180 days (default: 90)" \
"gc.reflogExpireUnreachable" "90.days" "Keep unreachable reflog 90 days (default: 30)"
}
apply_precommit_hook() {
print_header "Pre-commit Hook (gitleaks)"
local hook_path="${HOOKS_DIR}/pre-commit"
# Never overwrite existing hooks
if [ -f "$hook_path" ]; then
if grep -q 'gitleaks' "$hook_path" 2>/dev/null; then
return
fi
print_info "Existing pre-commit hook found — not overwriting"
return
fi
# Check for gitleaks
local has_gitleaks=false
if command -v gitleaks >/dev/null 2>&1; then
has_gitleaks=true
fi
if [ "$has_gitleaks" = false ]; then
print_warn "gitleaks not found — install it for pre-commit secret scanning:"
printf ' macOS: brew install gitleaks\n' >&2
printf ' Linux: apt install gitleaks / dnf install gitleaks (or download from GitHub releases)\n' >&2
fi
if prompt_yn "Install gitleaks pre-commit hook at $hook_path?"; then
mkdir -p "$HOOKS_DIR"
cat > "$hook_path" << 'HOOK_EOF'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Installed by git-harden.sh — global pre-commit secret scanning
# To bypass for a single commit: SKIP_GITLEAKS=1 git commit
set -o errexit
set -o nounset
set -o pipefail
if [ "${SKIP_GITLEAKS:-0}" = "1" ]; then
exit 0
fi
if command -v gitleaks >/dev/null 2>&1; then
gitleaks protect --staged --redact --verbose
fi
HOOK_EOF
chmod +x "$hook_path"
print_info "Installed gitleaks pre-commit hook at $hook_path"
fi
}
apply_global_gitignore() {
print_header "Global Gitignore"
local excludes_file
excludes_file="$(git config --global --get core.excludesFile 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$excludes_file" ]; then
local expanded_path
expanded_path="${excludes_file/#\~/$HOME}"
print_info "core.excludesFile already set to $excludes_file"
if [ -f "$expanded_path" ]; then
local has_security_patterns=false
if grep -q '\.env' "$expanded_path" 2>/dev/null && \
grep -q '\*\.pem' "$expanded_path" 2>/dev/null; then
has_security_patterns=true
fi
if [ "$has_security_patterns" = false ]; then
print_warn "Your global gitignore lacks secret patterns (.env, *.pem, *.key) — consider adding them"
fi
fi
return
fi
if prompt_yn "Create global gitignore with security patterns at $GLOBAL_GITIGNORE?"; then
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$GLOBAL_GITIGNORE")"
cat > "$GLOBAL_GITIGNORE" << 'GITIGNORE_EOF'
# === Security: secrets & credentials ===
.env
.env.*
!.env.example
*.pem
*.key
*.p12
*.pfx
*.jks
credentials.json
service-account*.json
.git-credentials
.netrc
.npmrc
.pypirc
# === Security: Terraform state (contains secrets) ===
*.tfstate
*.tfstate.backup
# === OS artifacts ===
.DS_Store
Thumbs.db
Desktop.ini
# === IDE artifacts ===
.idea/
.vscode/
*.swp
*.swo
*~
GITIGNORE_EOF
print_info "Created $GLOBAL_GITIGNORE"
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: git config stores literal ~
git config --global core.excludesFile "~/.config/git/ignore"
print_info "Set core.excludesFile = ~/.config/git/ignore"
fi
}
apply_signing_config() {
print_header "Signing Configuration"
# Always safe to set format and allowed signers
if setting_needs_change "gpg.format" "ssh"; then
git config --global gpg.format ssh
print_info "Set gpg.format = ssh"
fi
# shellcheck disable=SC2088 # Intentional: git config stores literal ~
local signers_path="~/.config/git/allowed_signers"
if setting_needs_change "gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile" "$signers_path"; then
git config --global gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "$signers_path"
print_info "Set gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile = $signers_path"
fi
# Detect existing signing key
detect_existing_keys
if [ "$AUTO_YES" = true ]; then
# In -y mode: only enable signing if key exists
if [ "$SIGNING_KEY_FOUND" = true ] && [ -n "$SIGNING_PUB_PATH" ] && [ -f "$SIGNING_PUB_PATH" ]; then
enable_signing "$SIGNING_PUB_PATH"
else
print_info "No SSH signing key found. Skipping commit.gpgsign and tag.gpgsign."
print_info "Run git-harden.sh interactively (without -y) to set up signing."
fi
else
# Interactive mode: run the wizard
signing_wizard
fi
}
detect_existing_keys() {
SIGNING_KEY_FOUND=false
SIGNING_PUB_PATH=""
# Check if a signing key is already configured
local configured_key
configured_key="$(git config --global --get user.signingkey 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$configured_key" ]; then
local expanded_key
expanded_key="${configured_key/#\~/$HOME}"
if [ -f "$expanded_key" ]; then
SIGNING_KEY_FOUND=true
SIGNING_PUB_PATH="$expanded_key"
# Derive private key path (remove .pub suffix if present)
return
fi
fi
# Check common ed25519 key locations (sk first, then software)
local priv_path pub_path
for key_type in id_ed25519_sk id_ed25519; do
priv_path="${SSH_DIR}/${key_type}"
pub_path="${priv_path}.pub"
if [ -f "$pub_path" ]; then
SIGNING_KEY_FOUND=true
SIGNING_PUB_PATH="$pub_path"
return
fi
done
# Check IdentityFile directives in ~/.ssh/config for custom-named keys
if [ -f "$SSH_CONFIG" ]; then
local identity_path
while IFS= read -r identity_path; do
# Strip inline comments and quotes
identity_path="$(strip_ssh_value "$identity_path")"
[ -z "$identity_path" ] && continue
# Expand tilde safely
identity_path="${identity_path/#\~/$HOME}"
pub_path="${identity_path}.pub"
if [ -f "$pub_path" ]; then
# Only use ed25519 or ed25519-sk keys for signing
local key_type_str
key_type_str="$(head -1 "$pub_path" 2>/dev/null || true)"
case "$key_type_str" in
ssh-ed25519*|sk-ssh-ed25519*)
SIGNING_KEY_FOUND=true
SIGNING_PUB_PATH="$pub_path"
return
;;
esac
fi
done </dev/null | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*[Ii][Dd][Ee][Nn][Tt][Ii][Tt][Yy][Ff][Ii][Ll][Ee][[:space:]=]*//')
EOF
fi
}
detect_fido2_hardware() {
# Check via ykman (cross-platform)
if [ "$HAS_YKMAN" = true ]; then
if ykman info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
return 0
fi
fi
# Check via fido2-token (Linux)
if [ "$HAS_FIDO2_TOKEN" = true ]; then
if fido2-token -L 2>/dev/null | grep -q .; then
return 0
fi
fi
# macOS: check IOKit USB registry for FIDO devices (works without ykman)
if [ "$PLATFORM" = "macos" ]; then
if ioreg -p IOUSB -l 2>/dev/null | grep -qi "fido\|yubikey\|security key\|titan"; then
return 0
fi
fi
# Linux: check /sys for FIDO HID devices (Yubico vendor 1050)
if [ "$PLATFORM" = "linux" ]; then
if [ -d /sys/bus/hid/devices ]; then
for dev_dir in /sys/bus/hid/devices/*; do
[ -d "$dev_dir" ] || continue
case "$(basename "$dev_dir")" in
*1050:*) return 0 ;;
esac
done
fi
fi
return 1
}
signing_wizard() {
print_header "SSH Signing Setup Wizard"
printf '\n %bPrivacy note:%b Your signing key is public — it appears in every signed\n' "$YELLOW" "$RESET" >&2
printf ' commit and on your GitHub/GitLab profile. Using the same key across\n' >&2
printf ' personal and work accounts links those identities (OSINT risk). If\n' >&2
printf ' identity separation matters, generate a dedicated key per context and\n' >&2
printf ' use git'\''s includeIf to configure per-org signing keys.\n' >&2
if [ "$SIGNING_KEY_FOUND" = true ]; then
printf '\n Found existing key: %s\n' "$SIGNING_PUB_PATH" >&2
if prompt_yn "Use this key for git signing? (enables commit + tag signing)"; then
enable_signing "$SIGNING_PUB_PATH"
return
fi
fi
# Offer key generation options
printf '\n Signing key options:\n' >&2
printf ' 1) Generate a new ed25519 SSH key (software)\n' >&2
printf ' 2) Generate a new ed25519-sk SSH key (FIDO2 hardware key)\n' >&2
printf ' s) Skip signing setup\n' >&2
local choice
printf '\n Choose [1/2/s]: ' >&2
read -r choice &2
local email
email="$(git config --global --get user.email 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$email" ]; then
printf ' Enter email for key comment: ' >&2
read -r email &2
printf ' Please insert your security key and press Enter to continue (or q to go back): ' >&2
local reply
read -r reply /dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$real_path" ]; then
# Relative symlink: resolve against parent dir
brew_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "$brew_path")" && cd "$(dirname "$real_path")" && pwd)"
if [ -x "${brew_dir}/../libexec/ssh-sk-helper" ]; then
brew_keygen="$brew_path"
break
fi
fi
done
if [ -z "$brew_keygen" ]; then
print_warn "macOS system ssh-keygen lacks FIDO2 support."
printf ' Install Homebrew OpenSSH (includes built-in FIDO2):\n' >&2
printf ' brew install openssh\n' >&2
printf ' Then re-run this script.\n' >&2
return
fi
keygen_cmd="$brew_keygen"
fi
printf ' Generating ed25519-sk SSH key (touch your security key when prompted)...\n' >&2
local email
email="$(git config --global --get user.email 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$email" ]; then
printf ' Enter email for key comment: ' >&2
read -r email /dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$email" ]; then
print_warn "user.email not set — cannot create allowed_signers entry"
return
fi
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$ALLOWED_SIGNERS_FILE")"
local pub_key
pub_key="$(cat "$SIGNING_PUB_PATH")"
# Check if this entry already exists
if [ -f "$ALLOWED_SIGNERS_FILE" ]; then
if grep -qF "$pub_key" "$ALLOWED_SIGNERS_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then
print_info "Signing key already in allowed_signers"
return
fi
fi
printf '%s %s\n' "$email" "$pub_key" >> "$ALLOWED_SIGNERS_FILE"
print_info "Added signing key to $ALLOWED_SIGNERS_FILE"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SSH config hardening
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
apply_ssh_directive() {
local directive="$1"
local value="$2"
# Check if directive already exists with correct value (case-insensitive directive match)
local current
current="$(grep -i "^[[:space:]]*${directive}[[:space:]=]" "$SSH_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*[^[:space:]=]*[[:space:]=]*//' || true)"
current="$(strip_ssh_value "$current")"
if [ "$current" = "$value" ]; then
return
fi
if [ -n "$current" ]; then
# Directive exists but with wrong value
if prompt_yn "Update SSH directive: $directive $current -> $value?"; then
# Use temp file to avoid sed -i portability issues
local tmpfile
tmpfile="$(mktemp "${SSH_CONFIG}.XXXXXX")"
trap 'rm -f "$tmpfile"' EXIT
# Replace first occurrence of the directive (case-insensitive)
local replaced=false
while IFS= read -r line || [ -n "$line" ]; do
if [ "$replaced" = false ] && printf '%s' "$line" | grep -qi "^[[:space:]]*${directive}[[:space:]=]"; then
printf '%s %s\n' "$directive" "$value"
replaced=true
else
printf '%s\n' "$line"
fi
done < "$SSH_CONFIG" > "$tmpfile"
mv "$tmpfile" "$SSH_CONFIG"
chmod 600 "$SSH_CONFIG"
print_info "Updated $directive = $value in $SSH_CONFIG"
fi
else
# Directive missing entirely
if prompt_yn "Add SSH directive: $directive $value?"; then
printf '%s %s\n' "$directive" "$value" >> "$SSH_CONFIG"
print_info "Added $directive $value to $SSH_CONFIG"
fi
fi
}
apply_ssh_config() {
print_header "SSH Config Hardening"
# Ensure ~/.ssh/ exists with correct permissions
if [ ! -d "$SSH_DIR" ]; then
mkdir -p "$SSH_DIR"
chmod 700 "$SSH_DIR"
print_info "Created $SSH_DIR with mode 700"
fi
# Ensure ~/.ssh/config exists with correct permissions
if [ ! -f "$SSH_CONFIG" ]; then
touch "$SSH_CONFIG"
chmod 600 "$SSH_CONFIG"
print_info "Created $SSH_CONFIG with mode 600"
fi
apply_ssh_directive "StrictHostKeyChecking" "accept-new"
apply_ssh_directive "HashKnownHosts" "yes"
apply_ssh_directive "IdentitiesOnly" "yes"
apply_ssh_directive "AddKeysToAgent" "yes"
apply_ssh_directive "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" "ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Admin recommendations
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
print_admin_recommendations() {
print_header "Admin / Org-Level Recommendations"
printf ' These are informational and cannot be applied by this script:\n\n' >&2
printf ' • Enable branch protection rules on main branches\n' >&2
printf ' • Enable GitHub vigilant mode (Settings → SSH and GPG keys → Flag unsigned commits)\n' >&2
printf ' • Restrict force-pushes (disable or limit to admins)\n' >&2
printf ' • Rotate personal access tokens regularly; prefer fine-grained tokens\n' >&2
printf ' • Use short-lived credentials (GitHub App tokens, OIDC) in CI/CD\n' >&2
printf ' • Require signed commits via branch protection (Require signed commits)\n' >&2
printf ' • Audit deploy keys and service account access quarterly\n' >&2
printf ' • If using hook frameworks (husky, lefthook, pre-commit), pin versions and review changes\n' >&2
printf ' • Use separate signing keys per org to prevent cross-platform identity correlation (OSINT)\n' >&2
printf ' Use git includeIf with gitdir: or hasconfig:remote.*.url: for per-org signing keys\n' >&2
printf '\n' >&2
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Safety review gate
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
safety_review_gate() {
# Skip in -y mode (user takes responsibility) or --audit (read-only)
if [ "$AUTO_YES" = true ] || [ "$AUDIT_ONLY" = true ]; then
return
fi
local script_path
script_path="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)/$(basename "$0")"
printf '\n%b── Safety Review ──%b\n' "$BOLD" "$RESET" >&2
printf ' Before running scripts that modify your system configuration,\n' >&2
printf ' you should review them with a tool you trust.\n\n' >&2
if ! prompt_yn "Have you reviewed this script (or had an AI assistant review it) for safety?" "n"; then
local review_prompt="Review this shell script for security issues. Check that it only modifies git and SSH config, makes no network calls, and does not exfiltrate data. List every file it writes to."
printf '\n You can review this script by piping it to an AI coding assistant:\n\n' >&2
printf ' %bClaude Code:%b\n' "$BOLD" "$RESET" >&2
printf ' cat "%s" | claude "%s"\n\n' "$script_path" "$review_prompt" >&2
printf ' %bGemini CLI:%b\n' "$BOLD" "$RESET" >&2
printf ' cat "%s" | gemini -p "%s"\n\n' "$script_path" "$review_prompt" >&2
printf ' %bManual review:%b\n' "$BOLD" "$RESET" >&2
printf ' less "%s"\n\n' "$script_path" >&2
exit 0
fi
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
main() {
parse_args "$@"
safety_review_gate
detect_platform
check_dependencies
# --- Audit phase ---
AUDIT_OK=0
AUDIT_WARN=0
AUDIT_MISS=0
audit_git_config
audit_precommit_hook
audit_global_gitignore
audit_credential_hygiene
audit_signing
audit_ssh_config
audit_ssh_key_hygiene
local audit_exit=0
print_audit_report || audit_exit=$?
if [ "$AUDIT_ONLY" = true ]; then
exit "$audit_exit"
fi
# If everything is already OK, nothing to do
if [ "$audit_exit" -eq 0 ]; then
print_info "All settings already match recommendations. Nothing to do."
print_admin_recommendations
exit 0
fi
# --- Apply phase ---
if [ "$AUTO_YES" = false ]; then
printf '\n' >&2
if ! prompt_yn "Proceed with hardening?"; then
print_info "Aborted."
exit 0
fi
fi
backup_git_config
apply_git_config
apply_precommit_hook
apply_global_gitignore
apply_signing_config
apply_ssh_config
print_admin_recommendations
print_info "Hardening complete. Re-run with --audit to verify."
}
main "$@"